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DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING FORGERY
ALBERT S. OSBORN t
Measured by the amount in controversy, certain cases in which forgery
is alleged are among the most important matters in litigation in American
courts. One or more of these cases, in which thousands, hundreds of thou-
sands, and even millions of dollars are being contended for, is in progress
on nearly every court day. These cases are mainly claims against estates
and corporations in the form of wills, notes, agreements or contracts. When
a claim is based on a forged document there are special difficulties involved
in the proof of the facts. Some of these difficulties cannot be avoided but,
with advance knowledge, they can sometimes be prepared for and, in some
measure, counteracted. Unprepared attorneys learn of them for the first
time in the midst of a trial. When all of the hindrances and obstructions
surrounding the proof that a forged document is in fact a forgery, are
enumerated, it is somewhat surprising when the undertaking is successful,
especially if proof must, to any considerable extent, be based upon the quali-
ties of the forged document itself. Some of these difficulties are:
(i) Positive supporting perjury by co-conspirators; (2) Definite and
detailed perjury by relatives and friendly witnesses actuated by sympathy
and friendship; (3) Restrictive legal rules still in force in certain states
regarding handwriting and document expert testimony; (4) Objections
and arguments by an alert attorney, whose aim is to prevent proof, who
quotes the old critical pronouncements which were the direct outgrowth of
the ancient laws excluding standards of comparison, reasons for opinions,
and the use of enlarged photographs and all optical instruments; (5) Un-
conscious prejudice in the minds of many of the older attorneys and judges,
based on the overruled decisions still printed in the books; (6) Lack of
scientific training and technical knowledge of the subject of forgery by
attorneys and judges; (7) Inexperience and lack of technical ability of local
technical witnesses in certain cases who are called to prove that a document
is not genuine; (8) The employment by the claimant, or rather the claimant's
attorney, of unworthy specialists as witnesses who take a case no maiter
what the facts may be; (9) Incompetent jurors who cannot be technically
educated during one trial; (io) Prejudice against the general subject of
expert testimony, based mainly upon abuses, especially in sensational murder
cases, of medical and insanity expert testimony; (ii) The law allowing
brief, unwitnessed, holographic wills to be probated, and in Pennsylvania
allowing brief, unwitnessed, undated wills to be probated on proof of the
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signature only. (12) Another serious difficulty arises when the genuine
signatures of a decedent, whose signature has been forged, are of a hesi-
tating, tremulous, decrepit and unskilful character and easy to imitate.
Under these conditions it often is difficult to prove that an actual forgery is
a forgery. In cases of this kind a forgery may, of course, be too skilfully
written or the imitation of tremor and weakness may be much overdone.
It is true, however, that the character and poor quality of the writing imi-
tated may be another serious difficulty in proving forgery. Some of the
most obvious and unmistakable forgeries, however, are the ones most stren-
uously defended. (I3) The final and not the least important difficulty is the
contingent fee contract in important claim cases, which makes an attorney
in effect a party financially interested to the extent of thirty, forty or even
fifty per cent. of a possible recovery, in some cases, of many thousands of
dollars.
The forgery cases hard to prove are not those involving the thousands
of insignificant forged documents in the form of checks and drafts cashed
every year in this country. These forgeries often are on fictitious accounts,
and the active operators occasionally are caught "red-handed" and then are
easily convicted on the surrounding circumstances alone. Yesterday and
today and tomorrow in this land of opportunity these fraudulent documents
will be paid. One of the largest surety companies states that forgery is one
of the most profitable crimes in America and reports that from twenty to
fifty million dollars are paid every year on forged documents. In most
instances these forgeries call for comparatively small amounts and usually
after discovery of the forgery there is no trace of the forger who, after his
success, departs for other fields, usually not far away.
These men, who are in fact "professional forgers", are, however, almost
without exception finally apprehended and convicted. They become so care-
less, on account of the ease with which these forged instruments can be
cashed, that they are led into serious errors. With many of them forgery
becomes an uncontrollable habit. They are convicted again and again under
different names and in different places and serve short sentences. One man
recently went to Sing Sing who had spent thirty of the seventy-two years of
his life in prison for forgery, and finally, as the result of a last desperate
attempt, the old and broken man went "up the river" probably for the last
time.
The class of forgeries referred to above as difficult to attack success-
fully are, as a rule, undertakings of a more ambitious character, sometimes
calling for amounts even up to millions of dollars; they are not cashed over
a bank counter but in a court of law. These important raids many times
are skilfully planned and often are successful. The legal rules, the proce-
dure, and the prejudice in many courts favor these claimants and their legal
DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING FORGERY
assistants. In many cities successful claim case attorneys are waiting, in
their mahogany furnished offices, ready and able to assist in the profitable
venture of cashing a major forgery on a contingent fee contract; they know
just what is necessary.
Like innocence in a defendant, genuineness in a document is assumed,
especially in a formal document, with seals, witnesses, silk tape and a blue
cover, all concocted to fit certain specific conditions in the life of a decedent.
These fraudulent cases are sometimes presented in court by a conscientious
attorney who, at the outset at least, believes the story of those who come
to him with the claim. Here and there attorneys withdraw in the midst of
a trial of these cases when the character of the claim document is clearly
shown, but this act is unusual and is even condemned by many members of
the legal profession. "Follow the case through," they say, "even if it goes
into hell."
The most serious difficulty in the proof of forgery in these important
cases is that first enumerated above, that is, supporting perjury by co-
conspirators and friendly witnesses.1 It appears clearly that it is not diffi-
cult to convince certain friends or acquaintances that any document is genu-
ine, when the undertaking is surrounded by sympathy and perhaps grows out
of conditions that, in some measure at least, seem to justify the claim. There
are friendly witnesses who testify positively in these cases without con-
sidering it actual perjury to stretch the truth in order to assist in securing
for a claimant what it is thought the claimant is entitled to receive. These
perjurors do not fear punishment for the act either in this world or the
world to come. Some of these witnesses will testify for a friend in this
way when they would not testify in their own behalf regarding a fraudulent
claim. The typical attitude of these witnesses, who have taken an oath to
tell the truth, is: "I do not care how the disputed document looks; Mary
ought to have the money."
'See In re Nelson's Estate, 191 Cal. 280, 216 Pac. 368 (1923). Expert witnesses having
testified that in their opinion the will was not in the handwriting of the deceased, such testi-
mony was amply sufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, notwithstanding the fact that
the acquaintances of the decedent familiar with his handwriting testified that in their opinion
the entire document was in the handwriting of the decedent.
In Matter of Glazer, N. Y. L. 3., April 12, 1934, at 1763, 1764, Surrogate Wingate said:
"As a result of the appearance and demeanor of the subscribing witnesses upon the stand,
there is no escape from the conviction that they have deliberately, intentionally and probably
concertedly endeavored to minimize everything pointing to the seriousness of the patient's
illness and magnified every contrary circumstance to the point of distortion. They have colored
their testimony until it is substantially unbelievable."
"Judges, lawyers, police authorities, investigators and the general public, are all con-
vinced that perjury is wide spread. Justice Joseph W. Keller, of the City Court of New
York, in concluding with 'perjury is a greater menace to the administration of justice than
congested calendars or any other cause', indicates the necessity for striking at the prevalence
of perjury if any feasible method can be found. . . . On many the oath has no, binding
effect. It is considered merely a tiresome formality, and the manner in which it is adminis-
tered in many courts does much to create this impression."- Charles K. Burdick, in THE
PANEL, January-February, 1934.
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In one important will case six of these "friends of the claimant" testi-
fied that they saw a will signed; yet, after the fraudulent character of the
document was shown, a jury decided that the will was a forgery. 2 In some
states this verdict would at once have been set aside by a "higher" court on
the ground that it was "against the weight of evidence", but only one judge
so voted in the appellate court. This judge followed the ancient rules and
precedents in a case in which the fact of forgery was so evident that it could
almost be shown to a child.
It is to be expected that alleged witnesses tQ a forged document will be
brought forward who remember the most unimportant details of an event
which occurred long before. The exact time, place and circumstances are all
described and, what is stranger still, often are described in just the same man-
ner by more than one witness. Who spoke first, just who were there, where
they sat, and just what was said, are all related in the utmost detail, although
the occurrence in some instances took place years before. The weakness of
some testimony is that it is too good.
Co-conspirators in these cases will of course testify in the most effective
way that their ingenuity, or that of their experienced attorney, can devise.
Some corrupt witnesses are effectively protected and their testimony is accen-
tuated by careful advance planning which partly justifies the contention that
they are disinterested witnesses. Testimony of this kind is of course very
formidable.
In the argument of the claimant's attorney, as well as in the law books
and judges' charges, all of this testimony by alleged eye-witnesses, no matter
how suspicious or false ii may be, is referred to as "the fact testimony" in
the case, as compared with the "mere opinion expert testimony" in the same
case. This disparaging distinction is often made no matter how effectively
this expert testimony shows the fraudulent character of the document.3
' People v. Storrs, 2o7 N. Y. 147, IOO N. E. 73o (1912). The decision was reversed on
another ground. See Baird v. Shaffer, ioi Kan. 585, 587, 168 Pac. 836 (1917), where the
court said: "The testimony of attesting witnesses to a will may be overcome by any compe-
tent evidence . . . expert and opinion evidence is just as competent as any other evidence.
Indeed, where the signature to a will is a forgery, and where the attesting witnesses have the
hardihood to commit perjury, it is difficult to see how the bogus will can be overthrown ex-
cept by expert and competent opinion evidence. . . The rule contended for by appellants
would frequently baffle justice and give judicial countenance to many a high-handed fraud."
' "They testified, in substance, that the decedent's signature on the register was not writ-
ten by him, according to their opinion. They referred to no fact nor pointed out any reasons
for their statements and left their flatly stated opinions unaided by the statement of any fact
to enable either the court or the jury to draw a legal conclusion as to the accuracy of their
testimony, or its probative effect. . . . Their misfortune in that respect may not be urged
against their honesty, but no doubt it should be considered in weighing their testimony, on
the controverted fact under consideration." Pioneer Coal Co. v. Polly, 2o8 Ky. 548, 555, 271
S. W. 592, 594 (1925).
See In re Creger's Estate, 135 Okla. 77, 82, 274 Pac. 30, 35 (929), where the court
said: "In the notable case of Baird v. Shaffer, supra, from a Supreme Court of Kansas,
which we have cited on another point, a bold forgery of a will was prevented from taking
its intended spoils by giving due and proper credit to expert and opinion evidence in regard
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One of these two classes of testimony is manifestly addressed to the
credulity of the hearer, while the other class is addressed to the judgment,
the scientific knowledge and experience of the hearer. Some courts have gone
so far as to say, one as recently as 1929,4 that in no case where witnesses
testify they saw a document signed should a decision against the document
be based upon any kind of expert testimony. In effect they say this should
be the rule no matter how logical, reasonable and conclusive the testimony
may be. This 1929 decision was, of course, a complete surrender to credulity
and prejudice.
There still are mature judges here and there in trial courts who will not
permit effective and convincing handwriting expert testimony to be given;
they will not permit forgery to be proved. It is unfortunate, as well as
unjust, when this prejudice vents itself in the form of unjustified criticisms
of capable and conscientious special witnesses who are endeavoring to assist
in promoting justice. The interests of justice certainly are safeguarded
when the judicial office is occupied by one who is fair, fearless and unpreju-
diced-that is, when he is permitted to take any considerable part in the
trial of a lawsuit.
In courts where the prejudiced and critical view of expert testimony
controls, it naturally is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove forgery in
important cases. In courts of this class hundreds of good cases are not tried
because of the hopeless prospect. The courts of certain states have long
maintained this critical attitude, although nominally decisions now say in
some of these states that all testimony must be considered for what it is
worth. The old prejudice still has its effect, however, as shown by the 1929
to the genuineness of handwriting. But this expert and opinion evidence must always bear
the qualifications given it as a result of recent scientific investigation, . . ..
For decisions in a similar vein see Sloan v. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq. 563 (1831) ; Gordon's
Case, 5o N. J. Eq. 397, 26 Ati. 268 (1892) ; Wright v. Flynn, 69 N. J. Eq. 753, 61 Atl. 973
(1905).
'it re Harris' Estate, 247 Mich. 69o, 696-697, 226 N. W. 66I, 663 (1929). "To permit
an expert witness in a case of contested handwriting to directly answer the question as to the
genuineness of the signature in dispute is to permit him to invade the province of the jury,-
to answer the very question which it is the duty of the jury to answer. . . . The opinions
of experts are of no weight when contrary to sworn testimony as to facts."
In a retrial of the case a will was declared a forgery by a jury verdict based on hand-
writing expert testimony, but the judge, following literally and exactly the 1929 decision, set
the verdict aside. When this case was appealed the Supreme Court reversed its own finding
of I929 in the same case and agreed with the jury. The I929 decision no doubt grew out of
prejudice resulting from the old critical Michigan decisions. The 1929 opinion actually
quotes as a justifying precedent an old English opinion decided nearly a hundred years be-
fore. It should be remembered that it was only nineteen years ago that genuine writings as
standards of comparison were first admitted in Michigan courts. There are many judges who
never tried an important handwriting case with real standards and under modern rules.
For illustrations of the application of the old rules see Matter of Foster's Will, 34 Mich.
21 (1876) ; Borland v. Walrath, 33 Iowa 130 (1871). In the latter case the court, at 133,
said: "It must be confessed, however, that it [handwriting comparison] is of the lowest or-
der of evidence, or of the most unsatisfactory character. It cannot be claimed that it ought
to overthrow positive and direct evidence of credible witnesses who testify from their per-
sonal knowledge."
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Michigan opinion. The law in the state of California, as in numerous other
states, formerly required a judge to charge the jury, if requested to do so,
that handwriting expert testimony was of a low order and "should be
received with great caution", and as a result was of course under suspicion.
In many cases this charge rendered the testimony attacking a document prac-
tically valueless and prevented proof of forgery. 5
A genuine document may prove itself by its own inherent and undeniable
qualities of genuineness, but this is not true of a forged document. Forgery
must always be supported by perjury. Perjury of all kinds and degrees is so
common and expected in courts of law that it attracts but little attention.
It is taken as a matter of course, and this is especially true in connection with
forgery cases. The oath has little, if any, restraining effect, especially as
unimpressively administered, and lawyers and judges, with no especial con-
cern, seem to consider that perjury is a regular part of legal proceedings.
Half of the testimony in certain cases is perjury.
The inevitableness of perjury in forgery cases is well understood and
this is especially true of cases of importance. This condition is no doubt
partly due to the fact that few perjurors are ever prosecuted. As a rule an
,unsuccessful claimant, who bases a claim on a crude forged document, is not
prosecuted but goes his way, or perhaps more often her way, undisturbed.
If a burglar attempts to break into a house and is caught in the act on a
ladder, he is prosecuted and sent to jail, but one can attempt to "break into"
a million dollar estate and escape prosecution, excepting in rare instances.
' "Is it not a fact that the letter 'r', as it appears in this word to have been changed into an
'n', strong evidence that the letter 'F' has been changed by striking out the cross to the letter
IT' ? . . . An objection to this question was made by plaintiff and sustained. . . . We
perceive no error in this ruling. . . . It was the province of the court trying the facts to
make all inferences from the facts in evidence." Kruse v. Chester, 66 Cal. 353, 355, 5 Pac.
613, 614 (1885).
This ruling in this case on the specific, detailed point described was no doubt correct, but
the comment following, referring also, it clearly appears, to this particular inquiry, has been
widened and extended, by certain trial attorneys and an occasional judge, to mean that an
expert witness can make no comment or interpretation of any kind whatever on the facts
pointed out and express no reasoning as to their significance or bearing on the question re-
garding which he is asked to give his reasons for an opinion. In People v. Bird, 124 Cal. 32,
56 Pac. 639 (1899), an objection no doubt based on the Kruse case, as well as Grigsby v.
Clear Lake Water Co., 40 Cal. 396 (187o), was overruled. The contention was that the
testimony was "argumentative".
The following decisions show the progress of the California courts: Grigsby v.
Clear Lake Water Co., supra at 405: "Such evidence should be received with great cau-
tion by the jury. . . " Estate of Nelson, supr. note I, at 283, 216 Pac. at 369: "Ap-
pellant contends that the trial court erred in refusing an instruction to the effect that
the testimony of expert witnesses [as to handwriting] should be received with great
caution. This instruction was properly refused." Hirshfeld v. Dana, 193 Cal. 142, 155,
165, 223 Pac. 451, 456, 46o (1924) : "It is the duty of the jury to consider and weigh the
opinions of the experts with the other evidence in the case and then determine upon
all of the evidence where the truth lies. . . . But it is never proper to instruct the jury
that expert testimony is or is not reliable or as to how the jury should appraise it."
Fifty-three years was sufficient time for the California Supreme Court to reverse
the old rule, but more than fifty years are required in some states. It will be seen by
the 1924 decision, however, that appellants "hark back" to the old restrictive decision,
hoping perhaps that the court will forget that they have overruled the old theory.
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In a great majority of cases nobody is prosecuted and nobody is even criti-
cised. It is not improbable that those similarly inclined are encouraged to
make a similar attempt, with the procedure improved and the errors perhaps
corrected that rendered the other undertaking unsuccessful. 6
Next to perjury as a difficulty in proving forgery, the main influence
protecting forgers is that growing out of the old decisions, annotations and
textbook criticisms and discussions which attack technical testimony regard-
ing proof of documents and handwriting. These rules were the direct out-
come of the old legal limitations that were developed in an illiterate and
unscientific age. Part of the efficient work of the attorney against the facts
consists in getting before a jury and into current newspaper reports a reflec-
tion of these old criticisms. Paragraphs and even editorials are thus inspired
and are written by those who do not know the origin of the criticisms and
of course do not know that they are thus aiding forgers.
One of the most common and most unjust criticisms is that a conflict
in testimony warrants a condemnation of all the testimony, good and bad.
.This may be true of only opinions but is not true of reasoned and illustrated
testimony. The attorney against the facts often purposely brings about a
conflict in the testimony in order that he may make this unjust argument,
thus slurring his own witness. Many textbooks and digests still quote the
old outlawed, critical stuff and it has its effect. In contrast with this unscien-
tific view, Professor Wigmore discusses the subject in a sane and scientific
manner and wisely says that expert testimony regarding handwriting should
be measured by its convincingness, and this is the growing attitude regarding
the subject in progressive courts in many states.
7
By reason of the old prejudice it has been necessary for supreme courts
to say, over and over again, "If document expert testimony is convincing
it should be allowed to convince." Medical and other scientific books do
not print and reprint the errors of the past, but a young lawyer who buys
the "reports" buys all the errors as well as the correct matter. If one even
now takes the reports and digests and annotations on this subject and follows
them back through only a few years, it is easy to reach the conclusion that
testimony regarding forgery is weak and unreliable and perhaps should not
be permitted in any court." An example appears in a recent digest of the
'Two notable and encouraging exceptions have recently occurred in the City of New
York. At the close of the civil action in the $3o,ooo,ooo Wendel case the matter was sent to
the District Attorney by Surrogate Foley, and the claimant is now serving a prison sentence.
In the $4,oooooo Ridley Estate case, just ended, the matter has also been sent to the District
Attorney by the same judge, and the claimant in this case, f convicted, faces similar punish-
ment. In the Borough of Brooklyn, New York City, an important fraudulent will was re-
cently declared void. After the most positive preliminary perjury, facts were discovered
which led to a withdrawal of the will, the latter concerning an estate of several millions of
dollars. No action of any kind was taken against the fraudulent claimants.
7 See I WIGmOlm, EvlEimcE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 693-709.
'The following citations from various states show the now almost unbelievable rulings
of the past. They are still in the books, however, and even now indirectly affect judgments
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law in the great state of California. This digest quotes first a forty-nine-
year-old opinion, Kruse v. Chester,9 as if it should be the first to be con-
sidered, despite the fact that the courts of that state have said repeatedly that
expert testimony on the subject should be considered for what it is worth, as
in the case of any other testimony. If the old digest opinion is followed
literally it makes a witness a dumb witness who simply points to what he
sees, with no interpretation. It is easy to understand how the old opinions
are praised and emphasized by the claimant's attorney, whose case must be
won against expert testimony. The old opinions are cited when it is known
that they have been overruled. Some of these later progressive opinions are
cited below.10
The steps in the progress from the ancient rules are substantially as
follows:
First, no handwriting comparison was allowed by witnesses or jury.
This rule was no doubt due, in part at least, to the illiteracy of jurors in
on the subjects discussed. See People v. Frowley, 185 Ill. App. 338 (1914) (comparison of
writing not allowed) ; Bowen v. Jones, 13 Ind. App. 193, 41 N. E. 400 (1895) ; Tome v.
Parkersburg Branch R. R., 39 Md. 36 (1873) (expert comparison of handwriting entirely
excluded) ; Vinton v. Peck, 14 Mich. 287 (1866) ; Taylor Will Case, io Abb. Pr. (N. s.) 300
(N. Y. 1871) (testimony from photographs of handwriting excluded) ; Hynes v. McDermott,
82 N. Y. 41 (88o) (expert not allowed to use magnifying glass) ; Hanley v. Gandy, 28
Tex. 211 (1866) (comparison of handwriting refused since "controversy will likely arise on
collateral issues"); Campbell v. Campbell, 215 S. W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. i919).
"The test of genuineness ought to be the resemblance, not to the formation of the letters
in some other specimen or specimens, but to the general character of the writing, which is
impressed on it as the involuntary and unconscious result of constitution, habit or other per-
manent cause, and is, therefore, itself permanent. . . . Upon these grounds directly, as I
conceive, although not on these alone, our law has not, during a long course of years, permit-
ted handwriting to be proved by the immediate comparison by a witness, of the paper in dis-
pute with some other specimen proved to have been written by the supposed writer of the
first." Doe d. Mudd v. Suckermore, 5 A. & E. 703, 705-7o6 (1835). This was the illogical
argument against the admission of genuine writing for comparison that was cited hundreds
of times in English and American opinions. The argument in effect was that an uninterested
glance was a better method of learning about a thing than to study it carefully. This is a
forceful illustration of the legal unscientific mind. This unscientific English rule was fol-
lowed by American courts, excepting those of Massachusetts and Connecticut. The federal
courts did not change the practice until 1913 and the change in Texas was not made until
1933. England changed the rule by statute in 1854. See infra note ii.
9 Supra note 5.
'°Venuto v. Lizzo, 148 App. Div. 164, 167, 132 N. Y. Supp. io66, lo68 (1911). "The
conclusion of a handwriting expert as to the genuineness of a signature, standing alone,
would be of little or no value, but supported by sufficiently cogent reasons his testimony
might amount almost to a demonstration. While the court in this case did not directly refuse
to allow the experts to state their reasons, as was done in the case of Johnson Service Co. v.
MacLernon, x42 App. Div. 677, the effect of allowing constant trivial objections and of the
erroneous rulings was virtually equivalent to such denial."
See further, Ausmus and Moon v. People, 47 Colo. 167, lO7 Pac. 204 (I9io) ; Boyd v.
Gosser, 78 Fla. 64, 82 So. 758 (I918) ; Fekete v. Fekete, 323 Ill. 468, 154 N. E. 209 (1926) ;
Dickenson v. Inhabitants of Fitchburg, 79 Mass. 546 (I859) (Massachusetts, together with
Connecticut, never entertained the old view) ; Wakeley v. State, 118 Neb. 346, 225 N. W. 42
(1929) ; Matter of Burtis, 43 Misc. 437, 89 N. Y. Supp. 441 (i9o4) ; McKay v. Lasher, 121
N. Y. 477, 24 N. E. 711 (i89o) ; Richards v. Huff, 1O4 Okla. 221, 231 Pac. 76 (1924) ;
Henry's Estate, 276 Pa. 511, 12o Atl. 454 (1923). It is interesting to note that as early as
i82o it was said: ". . . the mere opinions of witnesses are entitled to little or no regard
unless they are supported by good reasons." Harrison v. Rowan, 3 Wash. 580 (C. C. N. J.
i82o).
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many parts of England. Next, comparison of writing was haltingly allowed
with writing "in the case for some other purpose". Then in England in 1854
came the statute allowing writings to be admitted for purposes of compari-
son."' The Ohio Supreme Court in 1850, following Massachusetts and Con-
necticut, had adopted the new rule, and the New York statute was adopted in
188o,i 2 while the Pennsylvania statute was adopted in 1895.' 3  The whole
subject was, however, clouded by the ancient restrictions and the testimony
was often weakened, if not wholly nullified, by court criticisms to the effect
that the testimony was admissible but dangerous. This attitude continues in
certain courts down to date.
At first only opinions were given, but gradually the practice was
adopted that allowed a witness to give the reasons for his opinion that a
writing was genuine or a forgery. The extent to which this is allowable is
still being fought in certain courts, although in New York, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, Illinois, Florida, Kansas, Nebraska, and the leading states gener-
ally, the witness is permitted to give his opinion, the reasons and the reason-
ing which is the basis for the opinion. This is, of course, the last and most
important step in this kind of proof and not only enforces correct testimony
but exposes incorrect testimony to justified criticism and attack. Numerous
decisions now say plainly that if no reasons are given, or no good reasons,
the testimony deserves no consideration. The opinions cited herewith dis-
cuss these various points. 14
Lack of scientific knowledge and technical training of lawyers and
judges, let it be plainly said, is another serious handicap in proving forgery.
The technical proof that a document is a forgery is, of course, a scientific
proceeding and a serious difficulty in making this proof is the fact that many
lawyers and judges are not scientifically minded. Even the lawyer who
represents the worthy contestant in some cases remains practically ignorant
of the subject throughout the trial. There are books on the subject but this
lawyer does not even know their names. Document expert testimony in
cases of this kind, especially against well-planned and unblushing perjury,
is often unsuccessful, mainly because the trial attorney is not qualified to
try the case. Under his unskilled leadership the testimony is not presented
in the proper order and with the proper tone and emphasis. This is a diffi-
culty that could be removed but it often remains to the end. Many trials
are very far from being scientific performances and the outcome is the logical
result of the methods employed. Even a skilled witness is unable to present
n 17 & 18 Vicr. c. 125 (1854).
N. Y. CIviL PRAcrlcE AcT (1920) § 332.
= PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 28, § 162.
See Henry's Estate, 276 Pa. 511, 514, 12o Atl. 454, 455 (1923), where the court said:
"It may not be amiss to add that the weight of opinion evidence on a question of handwrit-
ing depends on the cogency of the reasons given; here they do not appeal to us as con-
vincing."
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convincing expert testimony without the assistance of a qualified attorney
who is prepared to ask the proper questions.
In some instances trial counsel in these cases are themselves not only
uninformed, but prejudiced on the subject and know but little more about the
case after they are defeated. They cannot, of course, make the proper, imme-
diate, vital arguments in answer to objections during the presentation of the
case and are almost wholly disqualified when it becomes necessary to make a
convincing argument at the close of the trial. Unqualified counsel of this
kind often spoil even the testimony of their own witnesses by persistently
putting in the evidence in their own bungling and ineffective manner. Un-
like the medical profession, there unfortunately is no such thing in the law
as malpractice.1'
It is of course difficult, if not impossible, to prove forgery by the testi-
mony of incompetent witnesses. In many localities there is no special wit-
ness qualified to testify effectively on the technical subject of forgery, espe-
cially in connection with difficult cases involving clever forgeries. In many
instances bank clerks and bookkeepers are asked to look at writing of this
kind for a few minutes and then, without further study or preparation, are
asked to give positive testimony which in many instances is not correct and
in most cases is not convincing.16 In some of the old opinions this offhand
testimony, as well as the testimony of the witness who has actually seen the
party write, perhaps once, is emphasized and glorified as being particularly
important. It would be better many times, with an uninformed judge, unin-
'a "While many of the criticisms of expert testimony as it exists are groundless, there is
still just cause for complaint, the responsibility for which rests upon the legal profession.
The remedies lie in higher standards of professional ability and practice in respect to this
subject, in the recognition of the necessity of a knowledge of it for a legal education, and in
the requirement of such knowledge for admission to practice." Lindsey, The Law of Expert
Testinmony and the Proposed Changes Therein (1902) 59 LEGAL INTELI.IGMCER 474, 475.
"The lawyer who introduces the expert is sometimes at fault. He overlooks the most
impressive thing. He seems to think that the main purpose of the qualifying evidence is to
satisfy the judge that the witness should be allowed to testify as an expert. Where this con-
ception is held by counsel a great deal of the force of such testimony is lost. The main
psychological purpose of the evidence which qualifies the expert is not to show that he is
competent to testify. This is, of course, a necessary purpose; but it is only a second-
ary one in importance. The main purpose is to lay a foundation for the evidence which fol-
lows. . . . The necessary time must be taken not only to qualify the witness as an expert
but to show the value of expert testimony. Unless the position of the expert is definitely
established at the beginning it might just as well not be established at all." BRowN, LEGAL
PSYCHOLOGY (1926) 113.
'See Succession of White, 132 La. &p, 902, 61 So. 86o, 864 (1911), where the court
said: "As to the expert evidence, we do not consider paying tellers of banks as experts in
handwriting. Such officials, doubtless, have a certain skill in the comparison of signatures
on bank paper, but cannot be considered as experts in chirography. . . . In cases of this
kind the work of an expert is of assistance to the court, in pointing out differences and dis-
crepancies in handwriting, which afford the judge a basis for forming his own opinion as to
the genuineness of the handwriting in question." See further, In re Varney, 22 F. (2d) 230,
237 (1927) ; Magnuson v. State, 187 Wis. 122, 135, 203 N. W. 749, 754 (1925).
"Whether one could obtain a sufficient notion of the general character of a person's hand
by seeing him write once only might well have been doubted. Tradition, however, has handed
down a fixed rule that seeing a person write once only is as a matter of law sufficient." I
WGmORE, EVIDExCE (2d ed. 1923) § 694.
DIFFICULTIES IN PROVING FORGERY
formed counsel and an uninformed jury, to try cases of this kind on the gen-
eral surrounding conditions and facts alone rather than upon any considera-
tion whatever of the technical questions by those who are not qualified. It
must be remembered also that there is present the attorney against the fact
who, in order to win, must prevent proof. He constantly utilizes and em-
phasizes all of the difficulties that make proof of forgery difficult.
There is also the corrupt witness, mainly developed by the contingent
fee advocate, who appears for anyone with the necessary price and defends
any forged document. When only bare opinions were required these cor-
rupt witnesses brought about a direct conflict in the testimony and often
aided the desperate attorney and his unworthy client. Now, however, in
many courts these witnesses must give reasons for their opinions and their
aid is not so valuable as in former days. If their reasons are not reasonable
they are given no attention.
Another serious stumbling block in the path of technical proof is the
ordinary jury. It is of course true that no matter how thoroughly a case
may have been prepared and how correctly presented, the verdict may be
against the facts if the decision is made by unqualified jurors. In many
states, as in New Jersey and numerous other states at the present time, the
principal weakness in the administration of justice is in the poor quality of the
jury. Untrained and inexperienced men and women of all classes, kinds
and qualities are selected to decide difficult questions presented to them by
disagreeing witnesses and disagreeing attorneys. Some juries, of course,
should be censured for improper verdicts on good testimony, but the primary
faults usually are in the methods of selecting the jurors and in the court
procedure, especially in those courts where judges have no power. In many
states a judge must sit silent and see justice defeated. In these cases justice
is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
Of course, if a jury is stupid it does not much matter how the facts
are presented; the decision will be based on something other than the evi-
dence. Forgery cases in other nations than the United States of America
are not tried by juries, but in this country difficult questions of forgery, of
science, of art and mechanics are in many courts now presented for decision
to those who manifestly are not qualified to do what they are asked to do. In
Oklahoma certain civil cases have been presented to a judge and to associates
selected from the members of the bar with most gratifying results.
When one considers the importance and majesty of the law, with human
rights, property and liberty within its control, with the great marble court-
houses and the noted law schools, great law libraries, and the enormous
expense involved, it is pitiful to think that finally important litigated questions
must be submitted for ultimate decision to unqualified jurors who should
not have been selected for this important duty. It is discouraging to think
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that this condition must continue year after year. Does it not seem' that
something could be done to bring about improvement if lawyers really
wanted improvement?
Expert testimony to the average layman and most lawyers, as featured
in reports of sensational lawsuits, is that relating to medicine or insanity.
There has been and still continues to be great abuse of expert testimony on
these subjects and there is ample basis for criticism. In these cases the testi-
mony is almost entirely mere opinion on a subject that cannot be illustrated
and demonstrated. In some of these cases expert testimony is merely a yes or
no answer to an hypothetical question that it may require an hour or more
to read.
In forgery cases, especially when considerable writing is involved, there
usually is a definite, material problem before the court that, when illustrated,
interpreted and intelligently discussed, can, in many cases at least, be under-
stood by intelligent hearers. Of course, if testimony is limited and restricted,
as for example in that California digest opinion, referred to above, then it
does not so much matter what kind of jury hears the testimony.
There is no doubt that the proof of forgery is made more difficult in
certain states by the laws relating to wills. This is especially true in the
courts of the state of Pennsylvania, where almost any scrap of paper with a
genuine signature on it can be made into a will.:1  This is true of brief post-
scripts on letters or postal cards, or a few words on a check above a genuine
signature. Three or four typewritten or handwritten words before a gen-
uine signature, or what witnesses say is a genuine signature, make a will.
"All for Flo, J. Cox", is a will requiring no witnesses, no date, and it can be
written anywhere on almost anything. Nor is an ordinary signature even
required; the will can be signed "Father", or by initials, or by a given name.
The theory which is supposed to justify the law that no witnesses are
required on a holographic will is that it is more difficult to forge a complete
document than merely a signature, and this no doubt would be some protec-
tion if a considerable amount of writing was required. More than one will
case has been tried in court, and the will probated, where the instrument
contained only a few words in addition to the signature, and, as stated above,
in one state at least, only the signature must be proved. Because of the
' See Harrison's Estate, 196 Pa. 576, 46 Atl. 888 (19oo) (Indorsement on envelope,
signed by testator, of words "for" or "to go to" a person named, held valid will) ; Beau-
mont's Estate, 216 Pa. 350, 65 At. 799 (i9oW) ; see also Hinman v. Hinman, 283 Pa. 29, 128Atl. 654 (1925).
It is unnecessary to have attesting witnesses in Pennsylvania. Will is properly proved
by testimony of two or more competent witnesses to testator's signature; subscribing wit-
nesses are unnecessary except in case of gifts to charities. Bilancich's Estate, 6 Dist. & C.
743 (Pa. 1925). Cf. Succession of Lewis, 174 La. goi, 9o6, 142 So. 121 (1932): "In order
to be valid an olographic will must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the
testator. Civil Code, art. 1588. Proof of this must be made by the declaration of two cred-
ible witnesses."
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obvious difficulty in proving the facts many of these undoubtedly fraudulent
claims are compromised, with liberal rewards to the forgers, as a contest
is almost hopeless.
Finally, it is no doubt a fact that the contingent fee develops conditions
that make it more difficult to prove that a forged document is in fact a for-
gery. Numerous legal writers say emphatically that no other one thing has
so prostituted the practice of law in American courts as the contingent fee.
This practice is not allowed in England or Canada. One striving for a
reward of perhaps a hundred thousand dollars, or even more, is strongly
tempted to find, prepare and present the kind of evidence that will lead to
success. Contingent fee cases can, of course, be tried honestly but they often
open the door to fraud and perjury. It is this experienced and often able
advocate, who seeks in every way to prevent proof, who has made necessary
the skilled and experienced special witness, or expert, who, against stren-
uous, ingenious and often unfair opposition, is able to counteract improper
and uncontrolled advocacy and present effective proof of forgery.
Notwithstanding the many difficulties still surrounding the subject in
many courts, it is a fact that at the present time hundreds of disputed docu-
ment cases are tried and won that would not have been taken into the courts
a few years ago when the old rules and the old prejudice were in full force.
Under modem conditions in many courts the proof of a disputed document
case is therefore not such a desperate undertaking as it once was, and every
year it is easier to prove that forged documents are not genuine, but, as
pointed out, serious difficulties still remain. The slow progress of reform
is shown by the fact that only last year the great state of Texas finally passed
a belated statute allowing standards of comparison to be admitted in a civil
disputed document case.18
"z Texas Laws 1933, c. xo6. Section i reads: "In the trial of any civil case, it shall be
competent to give evidence of handwriting by comparison, made by experts or by the Jury.
The standard of comparison offered in evidence must be proved to the satisfaction of the
Judge to be genuine before allowing same to be compared with the handwriting in dispute."
